Chronic diseases and labor market outcomes in Egypt by Rocco, Lorenzo et al.
Policy Research Working Paper 5575







Human Development Network 


















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5575
By causing a sizeable reduction in employment 6 
percent and labor supply 19 percent, chronic diseases are 
responsible for a major efficiency loss in the Egyptian 
economy. Furthermore the impact of chronic diseases 
on the labor market is not uniformly distributed. The 
older and the less educated suffer a larger drop in the 
probability of being employed and in their supply 
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of working hours. The authors estimate the reduced 
form equations of individual employment status, labor 
supply and the usual wage equation. They control for 
unobserved ability and individual preferences by means 
of a within-siblings estimator. Measurement errors in our 
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Introduction. 
According  to  WHO,  in  Egypt  chronic  diseases  accounted  for  78%  of  all  deaths  in  2002,  well  above 
communicable diseases (18%) and injuries (4%) (WHO, 2005). As a result of the epidemiological transition, 
the burden communicable diseases has declined, at the expense of an increasing burden of chronic. The 
transition  was  helped  by  massive  vaccination  campaigns  implemented  in  the  past  several  years:  child 
immunization coverage increased from 86% in 1990 to 92% in 2007, and the under-five-mortality rate was 
reduced dramatically from 104 to 36.2 in the last two decades
1. While life expectancy in Egypt has reached 
70 years in 2007
2, the incidence of chronic diseases hinders large proportion of Egyptians to enjoy  a long, 
healthy and prosperous life. Nonetheless, although age and genetic endowment contribute directly to the 
emergence of chronic diseases, risk factors such as smoking, mal-nutrition, lack of physical exercise play a 
major role.  
In addition to their burden of pain and  suffering,  chronic diseases  bring  about  important economic 
consequences. On one hand, they increase the demand of health care and, on the other hand, they may 
hamper people’s ability to generate income, especially by increasing absenteeism at work or by ultimately 
impeding people to work. 
In this paper we focus on the latter potential consequence. If chronic diseases reduce employment and 
labor supply, this would cause an efficiency loss to the economy as a whole, as the endowment of labor is 
not fully used and the number of “efficiency units” per worker remains below its potential. Therefore 
chronic  conditions  could  contribute  to  keeping  the  country’s  economy  below  its  production  frontier. 
Whether or not this is the case should be of interest to economic policy-makers, whose objective it might 
be to maximizing the economy’s production.   
The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate whether such efficiency losses do in fact occur in Egypt. 
More specifically, we measure the causal impact of chronic diseases on the probability of being employed, 
on the number of working hours supplied per week and on the hourly wage earned in Egypt, among people 
in their working age 16-64. Although many papers have looked at the impacts of health on the labor market 
(for recent surveys, see Currie and Madrian, 1999; Rocco and Suhrcke, 2008), few have specifically focused 
on chronic diseases (Gammon, 2005;  Wilson, 2001; Loprest et al. 1995; Suhrcke et al., 2007) and to the 
best of our knowledge no study has looked at middle income countries in MENA. The reason for focusing 
on Egypt is that it is one of the largest middle income countries, with a population of more than 70 million 
and, in many respects, it is representative of the Arab world, a particularly distinguished region around the 
                                                           
1 The World Bank, WDI 2010 data:  % of children under 1 year immunized against measles; and under 5 mortality rate 
per 1,000.  
2 The World Bank, WDI 2010 data: Life expectancy increased from 55 years in 1978 to 70 in 2008. 3 
 
world where religious restriction of  alcohol and pork meat consumption could influence the prevalence of 
chronic diseases. 
The results of our analysis indicate that the presence of chronic conditions reduces the probability of being 
employed by about 25 percentage points (from 50 percent on average). Among the employed, the amount 
of working time supplied is reduced by about 22 hours per week. No impact results on wage rates. In a 
country where about one quarter of working-age individuals report to suffer from chronic diseases, the 
burden on employment and on aggregate supply of working hours is substantial. Extrapolating the results 
at the country level would suggest that the current employment rate of about 50 percent would be below 
its potential by about 6 percentage points (in the absence of chronic diseases the employment rate would 
be about 56 percent
3). The aggregate labor supply, which combines the loss of employment and the lower 
number of hours worked by people reporting chronic conditions and  still employed, is about 19 percent 
below its potential. Assuming that the national production function is  of the usual Cobb-Douglas form in 
labor and capital, defined as              , the implied production loss would be about 12% of Egyptian 
GDP. 
It is not hard to imagine that the above effects are not uniformly distributed across society. Hence, the 
second  purpose  of  the  paper  is  to  analyze  how  the  negative  impact  of  chronic  diseases  varies  along 
dimensions such as age and education. Especially regarding the probability of being employed and hours of 
work supplied, the negative effects of chronic diseases are larger among the older and the less educated 
and those belonging to the informal economy. Therefore the impact of chronic diseases is not uniformly 
distributed across socio-economic groups, on top of the fact that the prevalence of chronic diseases is 
higher among the less educated, the older and to some extent the vulnerable groups. This implies that 
chronic  diseases  increase  economic  inequality  in  the  population,  because  they  hit  the  lowest  socio-
economic groups more frequently and harder.         
The identification of the causal impact of chronic diseases is challenging, especially because observable 
and, mainly, unobservable individual characteristics might influence simultaneously both chronic conditions 
and work-related decisions, producing a spurious correlation between chronic conditions and labor market 
outcomes. For instance, smoking and diet can be a consequence of individual discount rate (which may 
stand for individuals’ “patience”) and risk aversion, and more generally of individual preferences which 
simultaneously determine the choice of participating into the labor market. Likewise, genetic endowment 
might determine both individual propensity to develop a chronic disease and cognitive ability (Butcher et 
al. 2006). Perhaps more importantly, family background and the experiences of childhood might influence 
both  individual  decisions  about  health  and  education,  and  preferences  about  work-related  issues.  For 
                                                           
3 A 25 percent reduction in the probability of being employed among the 25 percent share of working-age people 
reporting chronic diseases is equivalent to about 6 percent points in terms of employment rate (0.25*0.25).  4 
 
instance a child grown up in a wealthy household, with parents employed in highly ranked jobs, might have 
been pushed to pursue a high profile career and, at same time, might have been used and educated to a 
healthy life-style with a vegetable-rich diet and regular sport practice, and thus in a position to reduce the 
probability of subsequent chronic conditions.  
To address these empirical problems, we look at the siblings living in those households surveyed by the 
Egypt Household Health Utilization and Expenditure Survey (EHHUES) 2002, a cross section composed of 
about 33,000 observations. Siblings are more similar in terms of genetic endowment, preferences and 
family background than any two randomly matched individuals. Therefore any pair of siblings shares a 
common family fixed effect that we can control for by means of within-siblings estimates. Of course, 
especially among siblings of rather different ages, it is likely that an important idiosyncratic component 
remains uncontrolled for (Griliches, 1979), as family background itself might change overtime (Ermish and 
Francesconi,  2001).  To  avoid  this  problem,  within-siblings  estimators  have  been  often  applied  to 
subsamples of twins (Ashenfelter and Krugman, 1994; Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998), as twins share exactly 
the same family background on top of an almost identical genetic endowment. Unfortunately the number 
of twins is too small in our data to be of any use. Thus, to check the robustness of our identification 
strategy, we approximated the ideal case of twins by carrying out our analysis on the restricted set of 
siblings  whose  age  differs  by  at  most  two  or  three  years,  obtaining  results  closely  in  line  with  those 
obtained from the unrestricted sample. 
A second empirical issue that we have taken into account is the fact that the indicator of chronic diseases is 
self-reported  and  therefore  subject  to  possibly  relevant  measurement  errors  (responsible  for  an 
attenuation bias in the estimates).   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework from 
which the empirical models are derived. Section 3 describes which variables are included in the model. The 
identification strategy and a description of the data and the samples are discussed in Section 4. The main 
results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 contains several robustness checks to inspect the validity of our 
identification  strategy.  Section  7  describes  how  the  effects  of  chronic  diseases  vary  depending  on 
education, age, household income and gender. Finally, Section 8 concludes. Two technical  appendixes 
contain further technical details.     
         
The model 
An individual i residing in household j is endowed with the following utility function which summarizes his 
preferences over the set of work alternatives: 5 
 
             
                 
         
where        
   is the wage rate the individual expects to earn, conditional on  the characteristics    
  
relevant to his or her productivity,      is the amount of time spent at work,          
   is the sum of direct 
and opportunity costs of working. Direct costs include physical, psychological and monetary costs. They are 
increasing and convex in     and depend on the individual characteristics    
  (in general not coincident with 
   
  . Of course individual health conditions are supposed to influence both wage rates and the disutility of 
labor. Finally, some zero-mean random shocks     might affect individual utility.  Let      be the cumulate 
distribution of    , supposed symmetric. 
In spite of its simplicity, this model is general enough to encompass three important relationships between 
health and labor market outcomes, i.e. how health conditions influence the decision of being employed, 
and, conditional on this, the amount of labor to supply and whether wage rates depend on individual 
health. 
Employment 
Denote by           
     
    the full set of individual characteristics. Given the concavity of     in    , there 
exists a unique utility maximizer    
           which is a function of the full set      An agent in his working 
age  chooses  to  be  employed  if         
       .  This  implies  that  the  probability  of  being  employed, 
conditional on characteristic    , is                         
     
         
      
    which can be linearized as 
                               . This is the first equation of interest, which is estimable as a the linear 
probability model 
                            (1) 
where     is a zero mean error term independent of all    . 
Labor supply 
A rational agent will supply the amount of work which maximizes his utility function. Such quantity will 
solve the FOC 
       
       
         
   
so that 
        
           
      
            (2) 
which depends on the full set of individual characteristics    . Upon appropriate linearization (see Appendix 
A)  we get the second equation of interest, 6 
 
                
         
                (2’) 
which relates the number of hours optimally supplied to     . 
Wage equation 
Finally we state a usual Mincer equation to model the relationship between log wages and human capital 
inputs. 
              
                    (3) 
This specification is usually adopted to represent the fact that a worker’s productivity (and hence his wage) 
depends on his own human capital and the fact that wages are dispersed also among people holding the 
same occupation.  
Empirical specification 
So far we have defined the model in very general terms. Nonetheless important hints about which variables 
to  include  have  already  emerged.  For  instance,  the  fact  that  wages  are  a  function  of  individual 
characteristics, wages can be substituted out in both the employment and the labor supply equations. 
Moreover, there is a clear indication that the (only) set of variables to be included in our reduced form 
equations are those influencing individual wages (productivity) and those influencing  the disutility from 
labor (   
  and    
 ).  We stress here that both observable and unobservable/non measurable variables do 
enter these sets. 
As  mentioned  earlier,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  poor  health  reduces  worker  productivity  and 
increases the disutility of labor. Specifically, we are interested in the role of chronic diseases and disabilities 
and the presence of such conditions is our measure of health conditions. In the dataset we use, Egypt 
Household  Health  Utilization  and  Expenditure  Survey  2002  (EHHUES2002),  a  representative  sample  of 
people is asked “During the last 12 months have you been complaining from any persistent health problem 
for at least 3 months (including disability, disease, injury) or any other chronic disease?”.  About 25% of the 
subsample of people aged 16-64 (working age) answer affirmatively (27% of females and 22% of males).  
Chronic  conditions  are  also  the  most  important  single  factor  influencing  people’s  negative  health 
conditions, according to EHHUES2002. For instance the probability of reporting bad health increases by 
25% in case of chronic diseases, after controlling for age, gender and governatorate of residence.   
Following the literature of labor economics, the set    
  includes human capital dimensions such as gender, 
education, experience accrued on the labor market (proxied by age), current health conditions (   
  ) and 
endowed ability (   ).  Hence 7 
 
                                                       
              
There are two major empirical problems. First, endowed ability is largely unobservable. Unfortunately its 
omission  from  the  wage  equation  will  cause  severe  bias  in  the  estimated  parameters  as  ability  and 
education are likely to be correlated. Although we speak about ability,     has to be interpreted in broader 
terms: besides pure cognitive ability, it includes also individual preferences and specificities, such as risk 
aversion, patience, genetic endowment. Therefore     is likely to be correlated with health conditions, too. 
For instance a low degree of risk aversion might induce the individual to take risks which negatively impact 
upon health. A high discount rate (indicating impatience) is likely to favor behaviors which have delayed 
bad health consequences, such as smoking and drinking. Finally the genetic endowment has been proven to 
be responsible of many chronic diseases. Controlling for     is therefore crucial to obtain reliable estimates.  
We decompose ability into its idiosyncratic and family component, by stating that                  . The 
idiosyncratic component     is, by definition specific to each individual, while     is the part common to 
household members. Needless to say, the more “similar” the household members, the greater the common 
component of their ability. For instance, genes would be much alike between siblings (and even more 
between twins) than between spouses.     
The  second  empirical  problem,  especially  relevant  for  health  conditions,  is  that  of  misreporting.  The 
correctly measured variable to be included in the model is    
   but we observe only self-reported health 
conditions which might be distorted. Typically more educated people are likely to know their health status 
better than the poorly educated, because they are more informed, take frequent check-ups and are, in 
general, more attentive to their health (Bago d’Uva et al, 2008). In other words less educated people are 
Figure 1 - Self-reported health by education level 
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likely to over-report their health conditions with respect to their true conditions. This is consistent with the 
surprisingly small positive gradient of self-reported health conditions that can be observed in Figure 1. On 
top of this, there are also random measurement errors. Let      be self-reported health. We assume the 
following relationship between self-reported and true health conditions 
         
                     
where    should be negative according to our hypothesis. The resulting equation to be estimated is then 
 
                                                                                         
                                  (3’) 
By construction     results to be correlated with the error term          . Typically, measurement errors 
result into an attenuation bias of the impact of health. 
The variables included in the set     
  are those which determine the disutility of labor. Only variables 
varying at individual level have to be included, while all those referring to household characteristics and, 
more generally, all those common to all siblings
4 are already captured by family fixed effects     . Marital 
status  of  women  is  likely  to  influence  opportunity  costs  of  working,  because  of  the  mutual  support 
established  within  the  couple.  Among  the  variables  affecting  the  direct  costs,  the  type  of  occupation 
influences the costs of working to a large extent. Next, certainly bad health will increase the disutility of 
working  and  will  also  require  spending  additional  resources  to  be  able  to  keep  on  working.    Health 
conditions are captured by the self-reported presence of chronic diseases of disability, as discussed above. 
Summing  up,  labor  supply  equation  (2’),  which  includes  the  full  set  of  variables                
     
  ,  is 
specified as follows: 
                                             
                                                              (2’’) 
which  differs  from  the  wage  equation  only  for  the  inclusion  of  the  variable  married.  Of  course  the 
parameters     do  not  coincide  with  α.  Except  for  occupation,  the  same  specification  applies  to  the 
employment  equation  (1).  In  this  case,  education  and  gender  are  assumed  to  capture  the  expected 
occupation of the employees. 
                                                           
4 Relevant variables likely to modify the opportunity costs of working and common to all siblings are labor market 
conditions and commuting costs as well as indicators of family endowment and gender composition. For instance 
availability of land and/or livestock create an opportunity for housework, especially for women.  9 
 
Identification strategy, sample selection and data 
There are few surveys in Egypt including information on both health and labor market variables.  Several 
rounds of the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) focus mainly on health and only little attention is paid 
to labor. EHHUES 2002 is relatively rich in both dimensions, as it includes information on occupation, hours 
worked,  cash  and  in  kind  payments,  frequency  of  payments,  although  its  primary  focus  is  on  health 
conditions, health care utilization and expenditure. Unfortunately this survey is cross-sectional only, further 
complicating  the  challenge  of  identifying  the  causal  impact  of  chronic  conditions.  It  has  long  been 
recognized that especially education and health are likely to be correlated with unobservable individual 
characteristics. These same individual characteristics are also determinants of individual productivity and 
individual propensity to supply work. Therefore, the omission of unobservables would make both education 
and health endogenous. A strategy to deal with unobservables is that of removing them by exploiting the 
within-individual variation, i.e. by exploiting the variations over-time in labor market outcomes and health 
of each individual. As unobservables can often be assumed constant, within-individual estimators, such as 
first-difference, are able to remove them from the model and still to identify the structural parameters. In 
our context, within-individual estimators would net out both idiosyncratic and common components of 
ability. This option is ruled out by the cross-sectional nature of our data. Another possible identification 
strategy is that of Instrumental Variables (IV). Here we make use of them only to solve additional problem 
of measurement error – as we shall discuss below –, but IV methods are often used to disentangle the 
impact of health and education from that of unobservables. The EHHUES2002 does not include variables 
suitable to be used as instruments, and external data, for instance, on reforms are difficult to find. Although 
the  levels  of  enforcement  of  any  reform  in  different  governorates  are  likely  to  differ,  increasing  the 
attractiveness of IV, reliable and complete data on the effective enforcement at different times and places 
are difficult to obtain, if they exist at all. 
The strategy we have followed in this paper dates back at least to the 1970ies (see Griliches, 1979 for an 
early survey) and exploits the fact that siblings and especially twins have similar characteristics. For siblings, 
part of the genetic endowment is common and, especially if they have lived together within the same 
family for long time, the family background they have experienced is similar (see Ermish and Francesconi 
2001 for a discussion on the extent to which family background can be assumed to be really similar). Of 
course this argument applies far better to twins, where both genetic endowment and family background 
essentially coincide. In this case, rather than exploiting within-individual variation, it is possible to exploit 
within-family or within-siblings variation, removing the common component     of unobservables among 
siblings.  Such a strategy, applied to samples of twins, has been followed by Ashenfelter and Krugman 
(1994), Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) among many others. Recently Oreopoulos el. al. (2008) adopted it to 
identify the long term effects of child health on future occupation. However the list of papers resting on 10 
 
within-siblings  variation  is  very  long  and  covers  many  fields  in  economics  (see  e.g.  Krashinsky,  2008) 
measures family effects on voting preferences). However, when applied to siblings rather than twins, one 
should recognize that the idiosyncratic component which cannot be removed may be relevant. Griliches 
(1979) and Neumark (1999) caution that neglecting the individual component might induce a distortion in 
within-siblings estimates even larger than in pooled OLS estimates. To limit this problem we have included 
among the regressors the order of births of the siblings, which in combination with age should capture 
differential  allocations  of  resources  within  the  family  as  well  as  differential  expositions  to  the  family 
background. In Section 6 we specifically address this concern more in detail, by approximating the ideal 
case of twins by restricting the sample to the  siblings whose age difference is at most two or three years.    
We have extracted from the EHHUES2002, which counts about 27,000 observations of people aged 16-64 
(working age according to Egyptian regulations), the subsample of all heads’ sons and daughters residing in 
each household from which we have removed the only sons. The resulting sample, labeled “sons”, is then 
composed of at least two siblings per household. Furthermore, we have extracted from the full sample the 
sample composed of household heads and of their own brothers, exploiting the detailed information on 
household members’ relationships. In Egypt, as in many middle-income countries, it is rather common to 
find extended families, where several generations live together. We label the resulting sample “head/bros”. 
The union of “sons” and “head/bros” produces the sample “siblings” that we have used throughout the 
paper. In Table 1 we have reported some key summary statistics referred to “siblings”, to its component 
subsets, to the full sample of the aged 16-64 and to an additional sample composed of the “only sons”.  The 
latter is the sample of heads’ sons who live with the household heads and have no other brother or sister 
living with them. This does not mean that they have no brothers at all, but only that their brothers possibly 
moved out from the original household. 
We are interested in investigating whether the sample of siblings can be representative of the general 
population  or  whether  the  choice  of siblings  introduces  serious  self-selection  bias.  While  selection on 
observables is not problematic, as it will be accounted for by the included controls, our concern is that the 
sample selection depends on unobservable characteristics. For instance, it could be the case that less 
endowed sons prefer to remain with their parents and brothers, in order to receive support and benefit 
from their family. In this case unobservable individual endowment will determine both the selection and 
the performance on the labor market. Fortunately, the within-siblings estimator, by removing a large share 
of individual unobservables, is quite robust to sample selection, as we shall discuss in detail in appendix B. 
In particular it is fully robust, if all siblings share the same endowment, i.e. if          for all i in household j. 
Otherwise, the interpretation of the within-siblings estimates is that of marginal effects in a Heckman-type 
model.  11 
 
Looking at Table 1, the differences across samples in most of the variables can be explained in terms of the 
age-gender composition of the samples, while there are no hints of a heavy selection on unobservables. For 
instance, it is natural to expect that “sons” and “head/bros” show different characteristics because they 
differ quite a lot by age, given that individuals in “head/bros” are typically one generation older than in 
“sons”. The same is true when we compare “siblings” with the “full sample”, because by construction we 
have removed most heads, all heads’ spouses and other relatives. Thus average age in “siblings” is much 
lower than in the “full sample”.  Compared with the “full sample”, we observe that the percentage of males 
is much higher in “siblings”, indicating that females are more likely to exit from their original family, to 
enter in the husband’s family or to establish a new family. Alternatively, males are more likely to marry and 
stay in their original family or to exit at later ages.  
 
Table 1 Sample description 
  Siblings  Full sample   Only sons 
  Sons  head/brothers  total     
observations  5900  1200  7100  27186  1045 
age   23.74  32.44  25.20  35.30  25.70 
age [min-max]  16-57  16-64  16-64  16-64  16-58 
% male  68.3  74.9  69.4  49.5  64.3 
years of education  8.31  6.77  8.05  6.58  8.34 
%  reporting  chronic  diseases 
and disabilities 
11.1  19.3  12.5  24.8  15.2 
%  reporting  bad  general 
health conditions 
6.3  11.9  7.2  12.9  8.8 
% married  15.62  45.0  20.5  67.0  22.39 
% employed  55.2  70.3  57.7  49.5  56.26 
% informal sector  53.0  46.3  51.9  47.2  56.2 
hours  of  work  supplied    
(among employed) 
43.42  45.91  43.91  40.95  42.96 
hourly  wage    [pounds]       
(among employed) 
1.45  1.28  1.41  1.79  1.35 
obs. per household  2.98  2.85  2.96  3.62   




2-8  2-8  1-19   
 
A useful benchmark against which to compare “sons” is the sample “only sons”. Their composition in terms 
of age and gender is similar, so that by comparing them, it is possible to guess if members of “sons” are 
systematically different in terms of education, health conditions, employment, wage and labor supply. By 
looking at the summary statistics we observe that the two samples are very similar in terms of education 12 
 
and  labor  market  outcomes,  although  they  differ  somewhat  regarding  health,  “only  sons”  performing 
rather worse than “sons”, possibly because mean age is about two years higher in “only sons”
5.   
The last empirical issue to discuss relates to measurement errors. Already Griliches (1979) warned that 
measurement errors might be emphasized in within-siblings estimation due to the correlation between 
siblings’ health conditions. Our indicator of chronic disease and disabilities is self-reported and there might 
be  misreporting  by  recall  errors,  little  attention  in  answering  the  questionnaire  or,  more  importantly, 
chronic conditions may be systematically under-reported when in fact they are present, especially among 
less educated people, less aware of their true health and less keen to submit themselves to regular check-
ups.  The  additional  “justification  bias”  (Bound,  1991)  which  induces  people to  over-report  bad  health 
conditions to justify their absence from the labor market or their lower labor supply has been assumed 
away in this analysis, as the most recent literature shows mixed results about its existence and relevance  
(Kapteyn  et  al., 2009;  Jones, 2007;  Kreider  and Pepper,  2007).  The measurement  error  bias  (likely  an 
attenuation bias) can be removed by an IV technique, which assumes that the random component of the 
measurement error is independent across two alternative self-reported measures (Wooldridge, 2002). We 
have then instrumented the self-reported indicator of chronic diseases and disabilities with an indicator of 
poor general health conditions which takes 1 when people report that their general health is worse or 
much worse than the average health of people of their same age
6.  
Results 
Estimates are reported in Tables 3-5. Columns 1-3 are discussed in this section and columns 4-7 report 
robustness checks that we shall address in the following one. For each equation we have reported OLS 
estimates  based  on  the  pooled  sample  of  siblings  (augmented  by  full  set  of  dummies  indicating  the 
governorate  of  residence  and  an  indicator  of  urban/rural  residence),  within-siblings  (fixed  effect  FE) 
estimates and within-siblings-IV (FE-IV), where we take into account the measurement error. 
Employment 
Chronic diseases and disabilities reduce the probability of being employed by about 7% according to both 
OLS and FE estimates. It is worth noting that such estimates do not differ much, indicating that individual 
ability (family effect), which is fully accounted in the FE column, does not influence much the impact of 
chronic  conditions, once the  type  and  the  place of  residence  have  been  controlled  for.  However,  the 
estimated impact of education is not significant with OLS whereas, the other variable correlated with 
                                                           
5 We have also tested whether the sample “siblings” was systematically different from the “full sample”, conditional 
on age and gender: we have stacked the sample “siblings” with the “full sample” and have estimated a probit model, 
where the outcome took 1 for individuals in “siblings” and 0 otherwise. A fourth-degree polynomial of age and gender 
interacted with age was used to properly control for age and gender. The variables education, employment status and 
our two measures of health conditions resulted significant, but their marginal effect was on the order of 1%.   
6 The measurement error embodied in the indicator of poor health can depend on education, a problem that can be 
overcome by including education in the main equation. 13 
 
individual ability, becomes positive and significant according to the FE estimate. Looking at column 3, we 
observe that attenuation bias induced by measurement errors is particularly strong. Once measurement 
error is corrected by means of IV, it results that an individual reporting chronic diseases is 25 percentage 
points less likely to be employed (the average probability is about 50 percent). Applying our estimates to 
the entire Egyptian population, the employment rate in Egypt is 6 percentage points below its potential 
(only 50 percent, rather than a potential of 56 percent). 
Labor Supply 
As can be expected, chronic conditions substantially reduce the number of hours supplied weekly by the 
employees. OLS and FE estimates indicate that the number of hours supplied is reduced by about seven 
hours because of chronic diseases. In this case OLS and FE estimates differ by about 10% from each other (-
7.55 vs. -6.80). Once measurement error is taken into account, chronic conditions cause a much larger 
contraction in labor supply, up to about 22 hours per week. This reduction accounts for about 50 percent of 
the average working hours in the “full sample”. The aggregate labor supply is about 19 percent below its 
potential.  This  gap  includes  both  the  loss  in  employment  and  in  individual  labor  supply.  The  implied 
efficiency loss at the macro-economic level is quite large. To suggest an order of magnitude, suppose that 
the  production  function  which  summarizes  Egyptian  economy  is  the  widely  adopted  Cobb-Douglas 
             . In this case the resulting output gap is of about 12%, i.e. actual Egyptian GDP is 12% short of 
its potential level, due to the burden of chronic diseases.  
Wage rates 
We do not observe an impact of chronic conditions on hourly wage rates. This might be due to rigidities in 
the labor market, where wages are determined according to occupation and age rather than according to 
actual individual productivity. Indeed, occupation dummies (non-reported) were significant here, while 
they were not in the labor supply equation.  We also checked that this is not due to sample selection. 
Figure 2 plots the log hourly wage in the full sample of working age workers and in the sample of siblings, 
distinguishing between workers with chronic diseases and healthy workers. There is no evidence of sample 
selection and plots confirm that chronic diseases do not influence wage rates. Note that once we control 
for  individual  ability,  education  does  not  play  any  role  in  explaining  individual  wages  on  average. 
Conditional on occupation and age, a higher level of education does not imply higher wages. Even when 
occupation dummies are omitted, education remains non significant
7. One possible explanation is the fact 
the Egyptian education system is rather ineffective, since “half of those who leave school by the end of the 
mandatory stage remain illiterate” according to Assaad and Barsoum (2007). 
 
                                                           
7 This result is valid a fortiori when we recall that the estimated coefficient of education includes a positive component 
coming from the mis-reporting in health (see equation 3’). 14 
 




Columns  4-7 of Tables 3-5 report some of the robustness checks we have performed. All equations have 
been estimated on three alternative subsets, the subsample of “siblings” aged 25 and more, the sample 
“sons” and the sample “head/bros”. When we focus on those aged 25+ we are looking at about the older 
50%  of  the  sample  “siblings”  (median  age  is  23  and  mean  age  25),  that  part  which  has  necessarily 
completed his education. In this case we have no concerns about possible problems of over-selection into 
the sample of people who ended their education just after the primary or secondary attainment level. The 
direction and the significant level of the results are consistent across the three subsets, although their 
magnitude changes somewhat, especially regarding the impact of chronic diseases on employment status. 
The broad picture that emerges is that the effect of chronic diseases is certainly negative but does get 
larger as people grow older.  
The  main  empirical  issue is  to  what  extent  our  within-siblings  estimators  control  for  the  idiosyncratic 
component of individual endowment. We have addressed this point by following two strategies.  
First, we have approximated the ideal situation of twins by restricting the sample to siblings of similar age. 
For each eligible household we have selected all siblings whose age difference was less maximum(????) 3 
years. The resulting sample is composed of 3713 individuals, and its mean age is 23.8. Using this sample we 
have estimated the employment equation and the resulting coefficient for chronic is -0.281 [95% C.I   -
0.508,   -0.055]. By restricting the age difference to just 2 years at most, the resulting sample further 
reduces to 2770 observations (mean age 23.5) and the coefficient of chronic is -0.206  [95% C.I. -0.459,  
0.048]. In both cases the point estimate is not significantly different from our estimate reported in Table 3 
(-0.2568). 
As  a  second  strategy  we  have  added  proxies  to  further  capture  individual  specific  unobservables. 
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in the past. Smoking is sometimes used as a proxy for (im)patience (Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer, 2003) and 
the decision to quit is seen as as a sign of willpower (Kan, 2007), two characteristics that are correlated with 
both  health conditions and labor market outcomes. Their inclusion has not altered significantly neither the 
impact of chronic nor that of education, supporting our assumption that only a small share of individual 
specific ability remains outside the family component that is captured by the within-siblings estimators and 
the proxy order (order of birth). 
Following the same idea of focusing on siblings of similar age, we have estimated the employment equation 
by age intervals. This procedure implies a drastic reduction in the number of observations, so that the 
choice of age intervals had to accommodate the need of a reasonable sample size. Indeed, the model has 
been  estimated  in  each  of  the  following  age  intervals:  16-20,  21-25,  26-30,  31-40,  41-64.  Results  are 
reported  in  Table  2  (line  *).  Unsurprisingly,  the  precision  of  the  estimates  is  much  smaller  and  their 
magnitude is increasing with age, a pattern already observed above.  The benchmark against which to 
compare these estimates are those of equation (1), augmented by the interaction chronic X age (which 
provides age specific effects of chronic diseases)
8, obtained by using the whole “siblings” sample. In the 
lower part of Table 2 we have reported such age specific effect (line **), calculated at the mean age of the 
corresponding interval, and its standard error. Moreover we add the p-value of a test where we check if 
age-specific estimates (**) differ from estimates (*). The two are not significantly different at 95% level of 
confidence. Actually, except for the age interval 21-25 the null of equality cannot be rejected at much lower 
levels of confidence.  
Finally we have checked whether there are long-term effects of the business cycle that an individual finds 
at 16, the minimum legal age for being employed, and at the time when he actually enters the labor 
market, after the end of his education period. For this purpose we have included the per capita GDP growth 
rate  in  these  years  (sources:  WDI  2007  and  Maddison).  They  always  resulted  in  non-significant  and 
comparatively uncorrelated with all the other variables included into the model. 
 
Table 2 – Employment equation. Estimates by age intervals 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  VARIABLES  16-20  21-25  26-30  31-40  41-64 
             
*  Chronic  -0.0376  -0.0577  -0.2121  -0.4761  -0.4968 
  s.d.  (0.1729)  (0.1916)  (0.3022)  (0.3174)  (0.3291) 
  Observations  1314  1204  506  407  200 
  Number of generations  609  569  243  190  96 
             
                                                           
8 This model extension is described in detail in the next section. 16 
 
  mean age  18  23  28  35  48 
**  chronic + chronic X mean 
age 
-0.0741  -0.1877  -0.3012  -0.4629  -0.7556 
  s.d.  (0.0924)  (0.0704)  (0.0711)  (0.1067)  (0.2057) 




Having observed in the previous section that the impact of chronic conditions might not be constant across 
age, we explore in this section whether  and if so how it varies also across levels of education, family 
income, gender and sector of the economy (formal or informal). 
In Tables 6 to 8 we have reported the estimates of each equation augmented by an interaction term 
between chronic conditions and respectively age (column 1),  education (column 2), household income 
(column 3), gender (column 4) and an indicator of informal sector (column 5).  
By looking at columns (1), confirming the findings discussed above, chronic diseases have a stronger effect 
among older people. Their negative impact on the probability of being employed is about 17 percent at age 
22  (25th  percentile  of  age  distribution  in  the  “full  sample”)  and  about  73.6  percent  at  age  47  (75th 
percentile of age distribution).  The impact on labor supply is about 21 hours lost at age 22 and about 24 
hours at age 47 (both statistically different from zero at 95%).             
As estimates of Table 6 column (2) indicate, the negative effect of chronic on the probability of being 
employed is lower among the more educated. Particularly the loss in the probability of being employed is 
only 10 percent for individuals with a university degree (i.e. at least 16 years of schooling) while it is 25 
percent  in the total population and 43 percent among people with no schooling. By looking at Table 7 the 
drop  in  working  hours  amounts  to  30  hours  per  week  among  people  without  education  (significantly 
different from zero at 95%) and only 15 hours (significant at 90%) among those with a university degree..  
Regarding the variation of the effect of chronic across levels of household (monthly) income – columns (3) – 
we observe that the probability of being employed is reduced by 28 percent among households earning 
300 pounds (25th percentile of income distribution) and by 25 percent among household earning 700 
pounds  (75th  percentile  of  income  distribution)  (Table  6).  Labor  supply  falls  more  among  poorer 
households  (30 hours/week with a monthly income of 300 pounds and 21 hours/week with an income of 
700 pounds, both significant at 99%).(Table 7) 
Next, the probability of being employed decreases more for males than for females and the difference 
across genders is significant (Table 6 - column (4)). Surprisingly, the impact of chronic on the probability of 17 
 
being employed is not significantly different from zero for females. Also, the impact on labor supply does 
not significantly differ across genders (Table7).    
Finally we analyzed how the effect of chronic diseases changes among people employed in the informal 
sector,  where  workers  do  not  benefit  from  any  employment  protection,  disability  benefits  or  health 
insurance.  In  our  data  there  is  no  explicit  information  on  which  sector  a  worker  belongs  to,  though 
extensive information on health insurance coverage is available. In Egypt only employees of the formal 
economy are entitled to a health insurance which typically does not extend to other members of the family. 
Indeed our indicator of informal sector is based on whether people are covered by a health insurance. We 
attribute individuals to the informal sector when they report that in their household no one is covered by a 
health insurance and those who report of having a health insurance provided by the school, which covers 
only the children
9. According to this classification about 51 percent of the sampl e belongs to the informal 
sector, a figure not dissimilar from the 49 percent in 1998 which  is estimated using the Egypt Labor Market 
Survey 1998. 
In column (5) of Tables 6 -8 we have reported estimates of the specification including the interaction 
between chronic  diseases and the informal sector indicator. Not surprisingly, chronic conditions reduce 
employment probability much more among workers employed in the informal sector (37 percent compared 
to a statistically insignificant 13 percent of those belonging to the formal sector) (Table 6). Similarly, labor 
supply falls by 36 hours per week in the informal sector compared to less than 13 in the formal (Table 7).         
From Table 8  we notice that the absence of relation between chronic diseases and wages  persists also 
within each sector. This result is further confirmed by Figure 3 which plots log hourly wage distribution  by 
sector for the sample of siblings. There is no evidence that chronic conditions influence wages differently in 
the informal sector. 
     Figure 3  Wages in formal and informal sectors 
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Conclusions and policy implications. 
Egypt experienced a dramatic increase in life expectancy and a more than threefold increase in GDP per 
capita in the last fifty years. The usual transition of morbidity from communicable to non-communicable, 
chronic diseases occurred  during the past decades. Chronic diseases  have by now clearly become  the 
largest threat to people’s health. Besides the obvious negative effect on the quality of people’s life, chronic 
diseases have negative and sizeable economic consequences, both in terms of efficiency and equity.  
In  this  paper  we  have  assessed  the  impact  of  chronic  diseases  on  labor-market-related  decisions,  i.e. 
employment status and labor supply, and their impact on wage rates. We have found that the probability 
of being employed is 25 percentage points lower among people reporting chronic disease conditions (the 
average probability is about 50 percent) and the amount of working time supplied is reduced by 22 hours 
per week (out of about 40). The impact of chronic diseases is larger among the more elderly, the less 
educated and the workers of the informal sector. Instead, among people with a university degree, the 
probability of being employed is reduced in case of chronic conditions only by 10 percent.  
Hence, chronic conditions on the one hand, potentially, cause a large efficiency loss at the macroeconomic 
level and on the other hand could worsen economic inequality, as they disproportionally hit vulnerable 
people with low socio-economic status.  
It is unclear at this stage whether the countervailing role played by education can justify the enlargement 
and improvement of education as a health policy. Of course education is important per se and in Egypt 
there is much room for improving it (Assaad and Barsoum, 2007). What is less clear is if such policy would 
be effective in attenuating the negative effects of chronic diseases. The reason is that we are not able to 
disentangle between two alternative explanations for the attenuation role played by education that we 
have found. On the one hand more educated people are more likely to be employed in non-manual and 
less physically demanding occupations, where chronic conditions are less likely to dictate their exit from the 
labor market. Therefore in this case education would be associated with a small impact of chronic diseases, 
simply because education gives access to white-collar positions: if so, it is the kind of occupation and not 
education which is the cause of the reduced impact of chronic diseases among the more educated. On the 
other  hand,  education  might  enable  people  to  better  manage  their  chronic  conditions  and  delay 
significantly the moment when they must leave their job (Cutler and Lleras Muney, 2006). Only if the latter 
explanation were dominant, would education be an effective instrument to improve health outcomes.  
The strategy followed to identify the causal impact of chronic diseases has taken advantage of the similarity 
in genetic endowment, preferences and family background among siblings. Several robustness checks have 
been performed to test its appropriateness, which allow us to consider our results reliable. Incidentally, it is 
surprising  to  notice  that  there  are  relatively  few  papers  in  health  economics  that  have  followed  this 19 
 
approach, although it looks especially promising when important unobservables are genetic or related to 
the family background.   
Given the nature of chronic diseases, their naturally increasing trend due to the success in extending life 
expectancy, and in light of the economic burden associated with those diseases, a sound health and social 
policy to limit the main risk factors of chronic diseases is critical in Egypt. While an important driver of 
chronic disease prevalence is population aging, evidence also indicates that a large share of the chronic 
disease burden are preventable or can at least be postponed by changes in health behavior (Ezzati et al 
2003).  Effecting  such  changes  in  chronic  disease-relevant  areas  like  diet,  physical  activity,  alcohol  and 
smoking is no small challenge, but there is a significant evidence base on effective and cost-effective 
interventions  that  could  and  should  be  considered  in  Egypt  (Institute  of  Medicine  2010).  Such  action 
appears to be particularly urgent in the case of Egypt (and possibly a number of other MENA countries) 
which is facing, for instance, an enormous (and widely under-recognized) challenge of obesity, well beyond 
what other most  countries  have  encountered  so  far,  both  in the  developing  and  developed countries 
(Fumagalli, Suhrcke & Rocco 2010).  
It  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of  this  article  to  discuss  the  interventions  to  manage  and  prevent  or 
postpone chronic diseases in Egypt. Suffice to say that an adequate policy response will be located within 
and outside the health care system proper. Extending health insurance to the vulnerable population at 
large, including self employed, unpaid family workers, and other informal sector workers, is only the first 
step  towards  at  least  improved  access  to  relevant  health  care  services,  especially  chronic  disease 
management. Measures outside the health care system include tobacco control policies (especially tobacco 
taxation), control of environmental pollution via regulation and legislation. Education policies are a further 
potentially important avenue for reducing the burden of chronic disease in Egypt. 
 
Appendix A - Linearization 
In this appendix we provide a description of the linearization involved in the labor supply equation, which is 
useful to understand the meaning of the coefficients that we have estimate. 
 Denote with      the function   
      . By first order Taylor expansion around (       
         , equation (2) 
becomes   
                       
                    
                     
                   
       
              
        
where              
  , which amount to  20 
 
                    
          
        
Now by a further linearization, we have         
            
               
        , that can be substituted 
above to obtain equation (2’). Note that the coefficients have a “technological” nature, as they are the first 
derivatives  of  the  function    
           
      
  ,  i.e.  a  transformation  of  the  labour  disutility.  Precisely 
   reflects the reciprocal of   
  . The more convex  , the smaller will be our coefficients. The economic 
meaning is that a larger wage will induce a small increase in labor supply if the marginal disutility of labor 
increases much in response to a marginal increase in labor supply.  
 
Appendix B - Sample selection. 
Observation1. 
The sample “siblings” has been drawn in a non random way from the “full sample”. It is possibly self-
selected  on  unobservables,  as  the  decision  to  remain  into  the  household  depends  on  individual  and 
household  preferences.  The  same  preferences  might  enter  in  the  labor  equations  inducing  a  sample 
selection bias in the estimates. Formally, let 
    
       
          
         
   
determine the selection equation, where  an individual selects into the sample if     
      , and 
                  
is the equation of interest. The fact that unobserved preferences           enter in both    
   and      makes 
them correlated. In the selected sample the conditional mean would be 
           
                        
          
     
where      
         
     is the inverse mills ratio. Now the inverse mills ratio is very much linear (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005, p.540), and little harm is produced by linearizing it as       
         
          
       
   
     . 
Suppose for simplicity that    
   is a subset of    , so that the additional instrument to be included in the 
selection  equation  for  identification  purposes  varies  at  household  level.  We  can  then  rewrite 
           
            
                    
         
                    
where    
   is the complement of    
   in    . Note that by means of the within-siblings transformation, the 
component    
           is netted out and we estimate             . This quantity is the marginal effect of 21 
 
   
   on the selected sample, i.e. the sum of the impact of    
   on the probability of being selected and the 
impact of    
   on      among the selected (see Greene, 2003, p.783).  
Observation 2. 
Consider again the model described above and write it as   
    
       
          
               
  
and  
                        
recalling  that  we  have  defined                   ,       
             
   and                 .  Suppose  that 
       
          . By applying the within-siblings transformation we have 
                                                            
Now  suppose  that       is  fully  common  across  siblings,  so  that                  .  Then  it  follows  that 
             
                   and there is no sample selection bias. 
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Table 3 Employment 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES  OLS  FE  FE-IV  FE-IV  FE-IV  FE-IV  FE-IV 
        age>=25  sons  head/broth  add. contr. 
chronic  -0.0668***  -0.0698***  -0.2599***  -0.3759***  -0.2030***  -0.5108***  -0.2616*** 
  (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.066)  (0.099)  (0.073)  (0.167)  (0.066) 
male  0.4703***  0.4646***  0.4598***  0.5413***  0.4439***  0.5795***  0.4493*** 
  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.031)  (0.016)  (0.037)  (0.016) 
age  0.0432***  0.0446***  0.0449***  0.0433***  0.0483***  0.0445***  0.0442*** 
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.006) 
age2  -0.0576***  -0.0580***  -0.0566***  -0.0506***  -0.0615***  -0.0544***  -0.0558*** 
  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.009) 
grade  -0.0010  0.0050***  0.0045***  0.0063***  0.0035*  0.0078**  0.0046*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
married  0.1691***  0.1346***  0.1335***  0.1072***  0.1305***  0.0701*  0.1307*** 
  (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.037)  (0.018) 
order  0.0110**  0.0156  0.0164*  -0.0000  0.0134  0.0246  0.0156 
  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.022)  (0.010) 
smoker              0.0239 
              (0.016) 
stopsmoke              0.0460 
              (0.036) 
Constant  -0.4875***  -0.5563***           
  (0.059)  (0.088)           
               
Observations  7100  7100  7100  2307  5905  1195  7100 
R-squared  0.335  0.343  0.328  0.363  0.308  0.406  0.328 
Number of generations    2680  2680  987  2216  464  2680 
F test      206.8  65.36  172.3  34.41  208.3 
Robust standard errors in parentheses              
















Table 4 Labor Supply 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES  OLS  FE  FE-IV  FE-IV  FE-IV  FE-IV  FE-IV 
        age>=25  sons  head/broth  add. contr. 
chronic  -7.5536***  -6.8425***  -23.5298***  -24.8231***  -21.6075***  -28.9538**  -23.5076*** 
  (1.194)  (1.569)  (6.784)  (8.058)  (7.886)  (13.332)  (6.794) 
male  3.7486***  4.3957**  4.1258**  4.2628  4.4442*  4.0570  5.1094** 
  (1.371)  (1.987)  (2.095)  (3.165)  (2.346)  (4.631)  (2.098) 
age  0.7993**  0.9878*  1.1125*  1.9133*  0.5670  1.9284*  1.1449* 
  (0.337)  (0.578)  (0.594)  (1.146)  (0.786)  (0.991)  (0.595) 
age2  -1.1273**  -1.1625  -1.0701  -1.8484  -0.2051  -2.0789*  -1.0882 
  (0.511)  (0.750)  (0.785)  (1.392)  (1.093)  (1.245)  (0.784) 
grade  0.0283  -0.0732  -0.1004  -0.3700*  -0.0875  0.0643  -0.1166 
  (0.094)  (0.140)  (0.143)  (0.192)  (0.163)  (0.328)  (0.142) 
married  4.4346***  3.7367**  3.7626**  4.0741**  4.8599***  -0.5130  3.8009** 
  (1.048)  (1.505)  (1.515)  (2.060)  (1.732)  (3.126)  (1.526) 
order  -1.0360***  -1.8184**  -2.0507**  -3.3387**  -1.9351*  -1.9967  -1.9547** 
  (0.387)  (0.903)  (0.927)  (1.367)  (1.085)  (2.060)  (0.923) 
smoker              -2.7863** 
              (1.268) 
stopsmoke              4.1514 
              (2.726) 
occupation dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Constant  43.7528***  34.5412**           
  (6.464)  (13.555)           
               
Observations  4528  4528  3754  1549  3007  747  3754 
R-squared  0.096  0.058  0.007  0.041  0.013  0.032  0.012 
Number of generations    2329  1555  685  1244  311  1555 
F test      88.94  42.26  64.77  23.20  89.77 
Robust standard errors in parentheses              















Table 5 – Wage Equation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES  OLS  FE  FE-IV  FE-IV  FE-IV  FE-IV  FE-IV 
        age>=25  sons  head/broth  add. contr. 
chronic  0.0182  0.0591  -0.1501  -0.4794  -0.1411  -0.1181  -0.1607 
  (0.033)  (0.042)  (0.173)  (0.322)  (0.197)  (0.353)  (0.175) 
male  0.2774***  0.2646***  0.2550***  0.2976***  0.2506***  0.2444*  0.2411*** 
  (0.042)  (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.102)  (0.064)  (0.136)  (0.058) 
age  0.0525***  0.0504**  0.0566***  0.1107***  0.0584**  0.0656*  0.0561*** 
  (0.011)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.038)  (0.025)  (0.035)  (0.020) 
age2  -0.0581***  -0.0735**  -0.0775***  -0.1373***  -0.0805**  -0.0878*  -0.0766*** 
  (0.018)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.046)  (0.036)  (0.045)  (0.028) 
grade  0.0177***  0.0053  0.0055  0.0026  0.0042  0.0074  0.0055 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.004) 
order  0.0015  0.0533*  0.0444  -0.0242  0.0459  0.0221  0.0426 
  (0.012)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.049)  (0.034)  (0.069)  (0.030) 
smoker              0.0273 
              (0.038) 
stopsmoke              0.0620 
              (0.089) 
Occupation dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Constant  -0.6095***  -0.6351           
  (0.209)  (0.394)           
               
Observations  2603  2603  1738  725  1391  347  1738 
R-squared  0.198  0.118  0.100  -0.046  0.106  0.122  0.099 
Number of generations    1629  764  330  614  150  764 
F test      40.54  17.58  35.24  6.107  41.13 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1               















Table 6 Employment (extensions) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  int. var. = age  int. var. = grade  int. var. = income  int. var. = gender  int. var. = informal 
           
chronic  -0.4312***  0.3133  -0.3074***  -0.1087  -0.1351 
  (0.104)  (0.222)  (0.118)  (0.076)  (0.092) 
chronic X grade  0.0233**         
  (0.010)         
chronic X age    -0.0220***       
    (0.008)       
chronic X income      0.0001     
      (0.000)     
chronic X male        -0.2459**   
        (0.102)   
chronic X informal          -0.2402* 
          (0.129) 
chronic + chronic X int. var.         -0.355***  -0.375*** 
        0.0861  0.0931 
male  0.4598***  0.4573***  0.4597***  0.4899***  0.4582*** 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.015) 
age  0.0453***  0.0440***  0.0449***  0.0450***  0.0438*** 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
age2  -0.0567***  -0.0449***  -0.0568***  -0.0565***  -0.0560*** 
  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
grade  0.0010  0.0044***  0.0045***  0.0047***  0.0046*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
married  0.1240***  0.1230***  0.1326***  0.1412***  0.1333*** 
  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
order  0.0179*  0.0097  0.0169*  0.0144  0.0188* 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Observations  7100  7100  7100  7100  7100 
R-squared  0.327  0.317  0.328  0.325  0.324 
Number of generation  2680  2680  2680  2680  2680 
F bad health  110.4  92.76  104.0  104.7  103.5 
F bad health X int. var.  88.43  104.0  87.26  81.95  55.63 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         














Table 7 Labour Supply (extensions) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  int. var. = age  int. var. = grade  int. var. = income  int. var. = gender  int. var. = informal 
           
chronic  -34.9014**  -20.9279  -39.3331***  -26.4338*  -12.8083 
  (16.137)  (20.859)  (12.857)  (13.706)  (8.332) 
chronic X grade  1.2950         
  (1.401)         
chronic X age    -0.0894       
    (0.611)       
chronic X income      0.0237     
      (0.016)     
chronic X male        3.4387   
        (14.172)   
chronic X informal          -23.4749* 
          (14.059) 
chronic + chronic X int. var.         -23.00***  -36.28*** 
        7.182  11.60 
male  4.1402**  4.1383**  4.1318*  3.5931  4.1087* 
  (2.090)  (2.096)  (2.122)  (3.060)  (2.138) 
age  1.1890*  1.1024*  1.2323**  1.1053*  0.9572 
  (0.609)  (0.599)  (0.613)  (0.596)  (0.613) 
age2  -1.1209  -1.0163  -1.2785  -1.0630  -0.9124 
  (0.800)  (0.850)  (0.820)  (0.787)  (0.809) 
grade  -0.2730  -0.1005  -0.0861  -0.0995  -0.1070 
  (0.226)  (0.143)  (0.145)  (0.144)  (0.148) 
married  3.3051**  3.7512**  3.2868**  3.7466**  3.4194** 
  (1.586)  (1.522)  (1.555)  (1.516)  (1.549) 
order  -1.9776**  -2.0801**  -1.9579**  -2.0426**  -1.6670* 
  (0.922)  (0.943)  (0.939)  (0.930)  (0.963) 
Occupation dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  3754  3754  3754  3754  3754 
R-squared  -0.004  0.009  -0.014  0.005  -0.021 
Number of generations  1555  1555  1555  1555  1555 
F bad health  52.20  45.50  36.90  44.57  44.59 
F bad health X int. var.  50.03  43.56  44.56  43.06  22.07 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        














Table 8 Wage equation (extensions) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  int. var. = age  int. var. = grade  int. var. = income  int. var. = gender  int. var. = informal 
           
chronic  -0.3048  -0.4900  -0.1093  -0.0579  -0.2240 
  (0.408)  (0.520)  (0.288)  (0.248)  (0.244) 
chronic X grade  0.0168         
  (0.033)         
chronic X age    0.0124       
    (0.018)       
chronic X income      -0.0001     
      (0.000)     
chronic X male        -0.1289   
        (0.322)   
chronic X informal          0.1793 
          (0.362) 
chronic + chronic X int. var.         -0.187  -0.0447 
        0.216  0.256 
male  0.2514***  0.2511***  0.2550***  0.2727***  0.2568*** 
  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.072)  (0.057) 
age  0.0591***  0.0568***  0.0565***  0.0578***  0.0570*** 
  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
age2  -0.0819***  -0.0831***  -0.0773***  -0.0785***  -0.0774*** 
  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
grade  0.0034  0.0053  0.0054  0.0057  0.0051 
  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
order  0.0467  0.0492  0.0440  0.0430  0.0418 
  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.031) 
Occupation dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  1738  1738  1738  1738  1738 
R-squared  0.095  0.096  0.101  0.096  0.100 
Number of generation  764  764  764  764  764 
F bad health  22.61  18.28  18.47  12.54  20.42 
F bad health X int. var.  24.63  20.22  20.68  26.28  9.302 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
   